media and their relationship has tended to neglect the role of emotion in shaping political life.
Anger has been a particular target of this dismissal. Philosophers since the Stoics have viewed the "civilized life as one that avoids anger" (Holmes, 2004: 127) . For Lyman (2004: 134) , the "claim that 'reason should be in control of the emotions' should be treated as an ideology designed to silence angry speech." Anger has been seen as a dangerous emotion that, because of its intensity and the challenge of controlling it, jeopardises the social order and leads to violence (Lyman, 2004: 133) . This view of anger has made it difficult to open up a nuanced debate about its role in political life -one which takes seriously its mobilising power and its consequences for public debate. Here, I want to make the case that understanding the circulation of anger in public discourse around the rise of Trump is, in fact, vital to understanding the phenomenon.
Anger is interesting in part because it is a potentially political emotion (Lyman, 1981: 61; Lyman, 2004) . It has been recognised in social theory as a reaction to injustice, and therefore inherently relational (Holmes, 2004) . Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, defined anger as "an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends" (1968: 1382-3). Similarly, for the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, we "only think we are angry because an outside observer describes our conduct in that way, in an attempt to assign responsibility for an action" (Dewey, 1983; cited in Ross, 2013: 19) . Though anger is in the first instance an individual emotion, it comes to matter politically when it is articulated by collectives, usually towards a shared objective of addressing an injustice.
The role of anger in social movements has become a matter of interest in recent years, as scholars studying oppositional and marginalised groups have begun to recognise anger as an important resource of collective mobilization and empowerment. Deborah Gould (e.g. 2010;  2012) has studied the role of anger in queer and feminist movements. For her, the very act of labelling emotions forms the basis for political empowerment -as when lesbians "feeling bad" collectively relabelled their emotion as anger (Gould, 2012) . By naming and articulating the negative affect of "feeling bad" about the consequences of patriarchy as "anger," it becomes a shared and public emotion which empowers the angry group to take action. This work recognises that anger can be a particularly useful resource for oppositional political life (see also Holmes, 2004) , and that it is readily recognised as an expression of collective injustice. At the same time -and precisely because of the association of the expression of anger with the collective activities of disempowered groups, often organised against dominant power formations, anger has also always been understood as a dangerous emotion that requires management and control (Nussbaum, 2016) .
However, political anger is not reserved for the actions of marginalised groups or social movements. Instead, grievances and disaffection should rightly be understood as permanent features of political life (Oberschall, 1973: 298) . Anger, therefore, must not only be seen as a destructive emotion in political life. Instead, it also serves a productive role, insofar as it generates bonds of emotional solidarity and forms the basis for collective action. As Ost Anger, solidarity and democracy have traditionally gone together. Democracy has usually been advanced when people angry about their exclusion from wealth and power join together in solidarity. This does not mean just mass demonstrations or disruptive action. From New Deal America to Keynesian Western Europe, liberal and socialist parties resuscitated democracy in the West by organising the anger of those long deprived of social protection. (Ost, 2006 :1) Anger has always been central to the strategic appeals of mainstream political parties, and should be recognized as a key ideological resource:
Politics does not become angry only when non-elites shout. Anger is built into politics through the everyday activities of political parties, which continually both stoke and mobilize anger in order to gain and maintain support (Ost, 2004: 229) .
There are two key reasons why anger is so important to the appeals of mainstream politics, according to Ost (2004) . First of all, there is widespread anger because of economic inequalities, and capturing "economic anger" is central to popular appeal, particularly successfully harnessed by illiberal populist political actors (Ost, 2006: 9) . Secondly, political parties need to cultivate solidarity to maintain their base: "This requires creating an emotional connection with supporters, the establishment of an 'us' against the 'them' of other parties, an emotional bond that can best be maintained when the other is cast negatively as an object of aversion" (Ost, 2004: 229) . For political parties and the politicians who represent them, anger must be organised, channelled and harnessed in particular ways, and the organisation of anger is vital to the construction of political narrative.
The context for angry populism
However, the current mobilisation of anger merits analysis as a distinctive formation. This theme has been picked up by journalistic and scholarly observers, to explain both the anger of Trump's ascent to divisions in the Republican Party, powerfully embodied in the Tea Party movement: "Was it any wonder, then, that a candidate came along whose anger was even more consuming and less constructive, whose disregard for political norms was even more flamboyant, whose appeals to racial resentment were even more overt, whose disregard for fact and fondness for conspiracy was even more pronounced?" (Ball, 2016) . The Trump presidency represents a rebellion against liberalism itself -an angry assault on the advances of groups of people who have experienced profound, if fitful, empowerment over the past half century. There is nothing about Trump's public pronouncements that indicates that he has welcomed these moral advances; his language, his tone, his personal behavior, and his policies all suggest, and foster, a politics of resentment. It is the Other -the ethnic minority, the immigrant -who has closed your factory, taken your job, threatened your safety.
Such observations highlight not only the prominence of an emotional politics of anger in contemporary politics, but also Trump's ability to tap into that anger (see Hochschild, 2016) .
Angry populism and a changing emotional regime
Even if much of the analysis of the rise of Trump has been based on observations about distinctive cultural, historical and economic circumstances in the United States, there is reason to think that these trends may reflect broader developments. The post-colonial writer Pankaj Mishra (2017) has suggested that we may be seeing the rise of a global "age of anger," fuelled by disenchantment with the ability of political institutions to effect social change. The argument around the emergence of an "age of anger" suggests a change in the ways we perform our emotions in public, centrally tied to political practices inside and outside -as well as against -institutions of governance. For the historian William Reddy (2001), we need to see practices of governance as driven in part by the way we speak about emotions in public. The expression of emotion, or "emotives" constitute "a type of speech act…which both describes… and changes… the world, because emotional expression has an exploratory and a self-altering effect on the activated thought material of emotion" (2001: 128). He introduces the term "emotional regime" to refer to the "set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and 'emotives' that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime" (Reddy, 2001: 129) .
If emotional regimes coalesce through the public expression of emotives, the media play a key role in facilitating their emergence and their change (see also Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen, 2011) . By studying changes in the use of emotional language in media coverage of a comparable event over time (and presidential administrations), we can therefore trace changes in the emotional regime. In this case, I am studying shifting emotional regimes by looking at expressions of anger in post-election and inauguration coverage of Obama's first election and inauguration in 2009, as well as Trump's election and inauguration in 2017. In taking this approach, I am following the lead of journalism historians who have looked at changes in coverage of, for example, the President's State of the Union address (Schudson, 1982) and Thanksgiving (Brennen, 2008) to understand transformations in journalistic practice. The purpose of my analysis, however, is not to offer a detailed historical exploration of emotional regimes, but rather to provide a snapshot of a particular critical moment of change, represented by the election of Trump. Such an analysis cannot establish whether Trump's rise of represents a unique emotional regime. But it can point to shifts in the relative prominence of particular emotions, and highlight what this tells us about horizons for public discourse and political change. In this context, it is worthwhile noting that the populist anger of Donald Trump cannot be simply understood as constructed through the discourses of mainstream media, but rather as emerging within a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) .
Trump, like other populist politicians, has been highly successful at mobilising support through his use of Twitter (Engesser et al., 2017) , and his tweets have, in turn, attracted extensive media coverage. The increasing prominence of social media shapes not just the content of mainstream media, but also their affective style. According to a number of observers, the affordances of Twitter facilitate a discursive climate which is more extreme, divisive and polarised (Shepherd et al., 2015) . Trump appears to be a beneficiary of this affective shift by crafting his charged messages on Twitter in a way that spills over into mainstream media (Karpf, 2017) .
Here, I will suggest that the ascent of Trump is a reflection of a shift towards an emotional regime of "angry populism" -a rhetoric which seeks broad appeal through the deliberate expression of anger and which feeds a journalistic narrative that understands anger as central to political life. My findings indicate that this anger is sometimes directed at specific targets, including the political establishment and other cultural and economic elites, women, migrants, ethnic minorities and anyone perceived as a threat to American interests (see also Newmyer, 2017) . At other times, however, the anger does not have a target, but instead seems to be a more diffuse and ill-defined-a form of anger which is politically consequential in its own right.
Studying the rise of angry populism
To illustrate this emerging emotional regime, I have studied the occurrence of the phrases "anger" and "angry" in the period between Trump's election in November 2016, and the day following his inauguration in January 2017, contrasting it with the period between Obama's first election victory in November 2008, and his first inauguration in January 2009. I have then taken a closer look, through a qualitative textual analysis, at the more manageable sample of the day following the inauguration for each of the two presidents.
I have chosen to focus on this particular period to avoid tapping into anger surrounding conflicts associated with the campaign, instead focusing the language of anger surrounding the election and inauguration. This period is critical in both establishing and contesting the reputation, vision and public image of a new president (Mansch, 2005) . Inaugurations seek to cement the dominant narrative around the president. They are mediated public rituals building consensus around the spectacle of affirming the new president and the shared values he or she represents (Bajc, 2007; Bormann, 1982; Kertzer, 1989) . They represent moments when the nation is often represented as coming together, and divisions set aside. This makes the study of anger in inauguration coverage all the more interesting: If anger is viewed as an uncontrollable and dangerous emotion, it is anathema to the ideological consensus of the inauguration ritual where we might expect it to be largely suppressed or invisible (Beasley, 2001) . At the same time, the inauguration coverage also frames the presidency by providing an interpretive context for understanding key debates surrounding the new president, and therefore provides a sense of the "emotional regime" (Reddy, 2001 ) s/he embodies. 
A clear pattern emerges from this analysis: Following his election and up until the day after
Trump's inauguration, there were 3828 stories using the terms "anger" or "angry," contrasted with 1449 for Obama. This gives an indication that anger was much more salient in postelection coverage of Trump than following Obama's first presidential victory. If we then look at the shorter time period of the inauguration and the day after in each of the two cases, we get a smaller and more manageable sample of the role of anger at this critical moment of establishing the interpretive framework through which the presidency is understood. To locate such a sample, I repeated the search detailed above, adding "inauguration" as a search This provides us with a sense of how the anger is explained -and, in some cases, legitimated.
If anger is a way of addressing a shared sense of injustice, the nature of the injustice matters hugely to the framing and interpretation of the anger. The table below shows the targets of the anger in the respective inauguration stories. I have included all instances accounting for more than 7% of references to the targets of anger. When anger was referenced in coverage of Obama's inauguration, this was almost never directed at Obama. Instead, the most frequent mention of anger was as a response to the historical experience of racism among African-Americans, who were celebrating the Obama victory as an opportunity for overcoming racist discrimination. Coverage of anger in the context of Obama's inauguration tells the story of a journey from anger to happiness and hope, represented by the historic rise of the first African-American US president.
By contrast, the anger expressed in coverage of Trump's inauguration overwhelmingly targeted Trump himself. This was true for more than half of all references to anger in the sample, and was based on extensive coverage of protesters gathering for the inauguration itself, as well as the Women's March on the day following the inauguration. Trump's opponents represented the majority (55.5%) of the subjects of anger -those represented as angry in stories. If we look more closely at these subjects of anger in the case of the Trump inauguration, what is particularly interesting is the relatively small number of different types of actors accounting for the vast majority: Trump, his oppponents and his supporters account for more than 90% of angry actors. This is in sharp contrast to the Obama inauguration coverage, where the subjects of anger are identified as representing a wide variety of actor types -to mention just a few, they include Kenyan citizens, Gaza activists, African-American community leaders, domestic politicians, and Bush supporters. This also reflects the wide variety of targets of anger in the case of the Obama inauguration. It suggests that discord and conflict have an inevitable place in narratives of political events, and that Obama's inauguration provided the opportunity for reflection on a wide variety of long-standing political grievances.
In many of the stories on the Trump inauguration, the anger of the protesters was described as energising a new social movement, and frequently legitimized with reference to the substance of their grievances. A widely syndicated Associated Press article observed that "Trump's call for restrictive immigration measures, religious screening of immigrants and his caustic campaign rhetoric about women and minorities angered millions."
Trump's supporters, however, were also described as angry, accounting for 13.3% of the subjects of anger. The anger of Trump supporters -usually directed at the Washington establishment as well as a decline in economic opportunities -was used to explain their voting decisions, as in this Associated Press news story:
Trump's victory underscored that for many Americans, the recovery from the Great Recession has come slowly or not at all. His campaign tapped into seething anger in working class communities, particularly in the Midwest, that have watched factories shuttered and the certainty of a middle class life wiped away.
Expressions of anger at the Washington establishment was another common target, accounting for 7.8% of references -consistent with understandings of populism as oriented around an opposition between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2007) . However, what is perhaps most striking about the construction of anger in stories about
Trump's inauguration is that a very high number of references to anger -20% -did not identify a target. As the literature on anger suggests, it is highly unusual for anger, as expressed in political coverage, not to have a target. Rather, anger normally requires a target for it to matter politically (Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen, 2011) . By contrast, in stories about
Trump's inauguration, anger appeared to become newsworthy in its own right. And in the vast majority of cases, this unspecified anger was that of Trump himself:
The 16 Even if it is a teleprompter speech -an unfortunate concession to liberal manners -the determination or, if you will, truculence, or golf face, angry and pissed off, is written in, or cemented, as he practices it.
[…] Trump, shoulders hunched, arms swinging, brow furled, lips pursed, is the medium of his message.
The widespread emphasis on Trump's performative anger -and his appeal to an aggrieved public through this anger -alongside the interest in the anger of protesters and opponentshas had significant consequences in shaping public debate over the presidency. It suggests the salience of angry populism, implying that anger is a viable interpretive framework for understanding political discourse and its performance, along with the motivations of political actors. More than that, Trump's populism works because of the anger it expresses: Anger is foundational to his appeal and his political project. But it also appears to be what we might call an umbrella emotion; one which covers a wide variety of grievances and disaffections.
What is also important to note is that not all anger is created equal: Whereas the media coverage that the anger of Trump's supporters and opponents alike is caused by legitimate grievances, and might give rise to new forms of solidarity -embodied, for example, by the positivity of protesters -the anger of Trump himself is largely viewed as opportunistic, illiberal and dangerous. As the Massachussets Telegram and Gazette reported:
Carol Sarafconn, a member of Agudat Achim, said the past year frightened her as she believed anger and hate took center stage and bigotry and intolerance became the norm.
"It frightens me that the intuitions I treasure are criticized and scrapped," Ms.
Sarafconn said. "…When social contracts are weakened, anti-Semitism isn't that far behind. When hate and anger become acceptable, anti-Semitism does, too.
What this implies is that Trump's populist anger is dangerous not, as political theorists might have it, it is incontrollable or violent, but because it fosters other negative feelings (bigotry, intolerance, hate) which are incommensurate with democracy (see also Ott, 2017; Cilizza, 2017) . This, indeed, might be another reason why Trump's anger is newsworthy in and of itself: It is seen to be one which closes down constructive debate and invites in fascism through the back door.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have made the case for the importance of considering emotion as a factor in mediated politics. In particular, I have proposed that we need to have a careful look at the role of anger as a mobilising emotion in explaining the rise of Trump. I have demonstrated a shift in the "emotional regime," represented by media discourses following Trump's inauguration, comparing them to coverage of Obama's first swearing in. In particular, I have argued that media coverage suggests a shift towards an emotional regime of angry populism.
This emotional regime renders anger a viable framework for interpreting political life, and suggests that its performance is essential to the brand of populism represented by Trump.
Given the prominence of anger in contemporary politics, then, I have sought to sketch out some of the complexities of expressions of anger: I have suggested that it is not just a tool of political opportunists like Trump. The anger of Trump supporters as well as protesters against him is given voice and represented as legitimate and pertinent.
Even if anger has long been denounced as a negative and dangerous emotion, it is also important to consider the ways in which protesters against Trump are seen to view it as positive and mobilising. But this alone does not offer a way out of angry populism. It may be helpful to look at examples of contexts where related emotional regimes -like those of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Marine Le Pen in France -have been defeated by appeals to more inclusive solidarities. Such examples remind us that collective and political emotions are dynamic and ever-changing, perhaps none more so than anger.
